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Summary: Humanitarian agencies are increasingly forming consortia to improve 
collaborative efforts to deliver aid to disaster-affected populations. However, there is 
little evidence on the effectiveness of consortia as a coordination mechanism. This 
paper describes the consortia efforts, actions and approaches used during 2012 Assam 
floods, and 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha. The data was gathered using semi-structured 
interviews with key informants from agencies involved in Assam and Odisha response 
programmes. It is found that consortia approach was useful as a space for learning, 
collaboration and increasing outreach and funding. This paper makes the case for better 
roles for local NGOs in furthering these partnerships and reflecting dynamic community 
needs and aspirations during recovery.  Consortia approaches can be improved through 
advance preparations and collaborations for quick and effective response. Further 
evidence on agency motivations, mutual interests and organisational capacities is 
required for advancing consortia as an effective coordination mechanism. 
Keywords consortia / coordination / donor / humanitarian agency 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Better coordination and communication after disasters can make post-disaster action 
more effective. One approach to achieving this has been the consortium approach, 
which involves agencies coming together as partners, funded by an international donor, 
operating within a singular financial and reporting framework, and sharing goals, aims, 
objectives and sectoral interventions. Recently in India, agencies in consortia 
implemented large-scale programmes after disasters, but little was documented on the 
effectiveness of the approach. This paper seeks to address this gap by elaborating on 
three examples of consortia initiated after disasters in Eastern India.   
The paper examines existing literature for an understanding of how this approach differs 
from other forms of agency partnerships and coordination. It then describes  disasters  
in Assam and Odisha,  where agencies in consortia responded to post-disaster needs. 
The analysis section highlights the potential benefits and drawbacks of the model within 
the Indian context, and the paper concludes with some suggestions to improve existing 
consortium approaches to better reflect the aspirations of the disaster affected 
communities.   
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2. Background 
 
This study is situated within wider debates around humanitarian sector reforms: the 
British government’s humanitarian aid policy underwent revisions with the publication 
in 2011 of the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), which insisted that 
humanitarian response be placed in the broader aid context to bridge the gap with the 
‘development’ aid budget.1 The current global humanitarian system was described as 
not ‘fit for purpose’, requiring radical overhaul.2 The first step in this direction seems to 
be acknowledging the need for collaboration between the humanitarian agencies and 
affected communities as equal partners, aiming for appropriate standards and 
meaningful leadership within the humanitarian community itself.3  
 
Evidence from international humanitarian operations highlight duplication as one of the 
biggest problems associated with poor coordination. After the 2011 Haiti earthquake, 
reports demonstrated that the multiplicity of agencies crowding around Port-au-Prince 
made effective cluster coordination essential. However, the focus on coordinating 
international actors came at the price of better engagement and ownership by local 
actors.4 Post-disaster coordination often emerges as a reactive approach, characterized 
by chaos resulting from inherent confusions, conceptual vagueness and the involvement 
of different actors with varied interests.5 Recent research highlights coordination as a 
solution to disorganisation and inefficiencies, difference and discord.6 The consortium 
model could potentially reduce duplication since participating agencies work under a 
unified proposal undertaking sector-specific interventions within agency-specific 
                                                      
1 UK AID (2011) Humanitarian Emergency Response Review: UK Government Response. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67579/HERR
.pdf, last accessed on 17th May 2017 
2 HPG (2011) Cause for hope? DFID’s response to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review? 
HPG Briefing note https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/7159.pdf last accessed on 17th May 2017 
3  Rose J, O'Keefe P, Jayawickrama J & O'Brien G (2013) The challenge of humanitarian aid: an 
overview, Environmental Hazards, 12:1, 74-92, DOI: 10.1080/17477891.2012.742368 
4 DARA. (2011). The Humanitarian Response Index 2011: Focus on Haiti Building Back Better. Madrid, 
Spain. 
5 Lizarralde, G., Johnson, C., & Davidson, C. D. (2009). Rebuilding after disasters: from emergency to 
sustainability (hardback). (G. Lizarralde, C. Johnson, & C. D. Davidson, Eds.). Routledge. 
6 Fiori, Juliano, Fernando Espada, Jessica Field, and Sophie Dicker. The Echo Chamber: Results, 
Management, and the Humanitarian Effectiveness Agenda. London: Humanitarian Affairs Team & 
Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, 2016. 
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geographies using similar formats and procedures for joint reporting, needs assessment, 
data collection, intervention and financial mechanisms.  
 
This paper posits that the consortium model is under-analysed in existing literature, and 
so a question is: How does the consortium approach differ from the partnership 
coordination approaches that are more commonly scrutinised in academic analysis? 
Coordination mechanisms vary according to the type of agencies involved in the 
coordination fora and the operational framework existing in-country.  There is 
coordination among international non-government organisations (INGOs),  between 
donors and national stakeholders, between government organisations and non-
government organisations (NGOs), as well as inter-agency coordination (IAC) and the 
participation of local stakeholders and civil society organisations. There are also 
technical working groups, international forums, national and regional networks. Yet a 
study after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake in India found inter-agency humanitarian 
coordination has not generated wide debate. 7 Establishing common interests, goals and 
plans of action is necessary for ‘harmonisation’ of national and international 
humanitarian aid.8 Civil society institutions play a necessary role in such mechanisms as 
they foster cooperation and coordination within a community which can, in turn, lead to 
a greater trust and respect among its members.9  
 
The cluster system was introduced during the Humanitarian Reform Process as a means 
of rationalising humanitarian operations and giving them tighter direction, making them 
more needs-based10. This approach addresses gaps and strengthens the effectiveness of 
humanitarian response by building partnerships, clarifying the division of labour among 
organisations and better defining agency roles and responsibilities.11 International 
assistance through the cluster system is activated after a disaster only in response to a 
formal request from the affected government,12 which first reacts to the scale of 
disaster, assessing  its own capacity and resources to respond to the needs of its people 
before initiating a ‘call’  for humanitarian assistance.13 The Government of India does 
not follow this cluster approach  to international assistance in the wake of disasters 
there, but is moving instead towards managing its own disasters. A recent discussion 
paper notes India’s emergence as a new donor funding relief efforts in other countries 
                                                      
7 Nabi, P. G. (2014). Coordinating post-disaster humanitarian response: lessons from the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, India. Development in Practice, 24(8), 975–
988. doi:10.1080/09614524.2014.964187 
8 Kenny, S. (2005). Reconstruction in Aceh: Building whose capacity? Community Development Journal, 42(2), 206–221. doi:10.1093/cdj/bsi098 
9 Mayunga, J. S. (2007). Understanding and Applying the Concept of Community Disaster Resilience: A capital-based approach. In draft working paper prepared 
for the summer academy, Megacities as Hotspots of Risk: Social Vulnerability and Resilience Building (p. 16). Munich, Germany. 
10 OCHA, Cluster Coordination (2014), accessed 13 May 2017. http://www.unocha.org/country/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination. 
11 HSRU (2011) What is the cluster approach. Cluster Approach https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach 
12 IFRC (2012), Accessed 13 May 2017 www.ifrc.org 
13 King. (2015). Resilience in the Humanitarian Sphere: Stimulating Resilience for Recovery in Haiti. Doctoral thesis, Loughborough University. 
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and the withdrawal of international donors from providing humanitarian assistance 
within the country.14 
 
The Indian Disaster Management Act, 2005 provides for Inter-agency coordination (IAC) 
between different Central and State Government Agencies. There are also district level 
coordination mechanisms, through which responding NGOs coordinate on a regular 
basis with government departments in the district. After recent disasters, the NGO 
Sphere India facilitated the activation of Unified Response Strategy, conducting regular 
meetings with responding NGOs.15 Despite these measures to facilitate coordination, 
numerous studies have found critical gaps. The lack of coordination mechanisms after 
the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, for instance, resulted in some affected people receiving 
relief packages thrice while others’ needs remained unaddressed.16 After the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in Tamil Nadu, the district and state level coordination structures 
weakened and died after immediate needs were met.17  
 
The consortium model differs from the these coordination models in its capacity to 
reduce duplication: participating agencies submit joint proposals to donors and specify 
the spatial responsibilities and interventions that will be undertaken. They communicate 
with each other, thereby reducing duplication of efforts and geographies, and 
addressing larger numbers of affected people’s needs. 18 Humanitarian INGOs are 
increasingly engaging in consortia efforts that bind these organisations through their 
mutual interest in improved performance, building coherence between their strategies 
and institutional practices. Although the adoption of consortium model as a strategy 
provides a logic for the development of technical skills and standards of the agencies as 
a collective, it is inescapably driven by a logic of the market, which fosters competition 
for expertise, for profile, and indeed for resources. 19 Agencies that used to compete for 
donor funding form a consortium, responding to new demands from the donors to 
enhance operations and to meet the demands of the communities affected by disasters. 
This dynamic within humanitarian agencies working in consortia and their interactions 
                                                      
14 Menon, V. C (2016) Changing dynamics of humanitarian financing in India: A discussion paper Accessed on 29 May 
2017 Available on http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/indian-humanitarian-paper-230516.pdf 
15 Sphere India (2007) Accessed 13 May 2017 http://www.sphereindia.org.in/sphere_india_evolution.html 
16 Nabi, P. G. (2014). Coordinating post-disaster humanitarian response: lessons from the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, 
India. Development in Practice, 24(8), 975–988. doi:10.1080/09614524.2014.964187 
17 Raju, E., & Becker, P. (2013). Multi-organisational coordination for disaster recovery: The story of post-tsunami 
Tamil Nadu, India. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 4, 82–91. doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.02.004 
18 ECB (2012), What We Know About Collaboration: the ECB Country Consortium Experience Emergency Capacity 
Building: The 10. Key Factors for Success www.ecbproject.org/consortium/learning 
19 Fiori, Juliano, Fernando Espada, Jessica Field, and Sophie Dicker. The Echo Chamber: Results, Management, and 
the Humanitarian Effectiveness Agenda. London: Humanitarian Affairs Team & Humanitarian and Conflict Response 
Institute, 2016. 
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with existing institutional mechanisms for coordination are explored with the help of 
three empirical cases from Eastern India. 
 
 
 
a. Disaster context in Assam and Odisha 
Eastern India has faced a continuous onslaught of floods, cyclones, drought, landslides 
and erosion in this decade, and the states of Assam and Odisha have been hard hit.20  
Floods come as no surprise in Assam, in North-Eastern India, where high annual rainfall 
averages  2,546 mm. In 2012, Assam faced consecutive flood waves from June-October 
due to breaches in embankments, 43 on the river Brahmaputra and 14 on its tributaries. 
The first wave of floods affected 2.4 million people in 4,540 villages. The floods 
displaced 543,088 people and caused 126 deaths with 19 reported missing.21 Floods and 
erosion recurred in the same areas in 2013 affecting the recovery after the 2012 floods. 
In 2013, Cyclone Phailin, categorised as Very Severe Cyclonic Storm by the Indian 
Meteorological Department (IMD), made landfall in Gopalpur, Ganjam, Odisha on 12th 
October, affecting 18 out of thirty districts in Odisha and Andhra Pradesh. Over 1 million 
people were evacuated in the 36 hours preceding the cyclone’s landfall. The cyclone 
killed 44 people, damaged 256,633 homes and affected 13.2 million people.22 The 
situation was compounded, following the cyclone, when heavy rainfall precipitated flash 
floods in Odisha’s rivers – the Baitarani, Budhabalanga, Rusikulya, Subarnarekha and 
Jalaka.  
Following media coverage on the disasters in Assam and Odisha, humanitarian 
organisations undertook joint needs assessment in critically hit areas. Some agencies, 
including Oxfam, launched relief operations immediately. This was possible because 
they partnered with local  NGOs, and participated in coordination meetings with local 
government bodies. They secured funding from international donors by submitting joint 
proposals. The European Commission’s Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection 
Department (ECHO) approved €2 m to assist affected people in Assam, mainly to 
address water and sanitation needs, improve food security through cash transfers and 
provide transitional shelter  to the worst-affected vulnerable households. In Odisha, the 
Department for International Development (UK AID) provided €2.3 through the Rapid 
                                                      
20 Recent disasters were investigated in these two states as part of author’s doctoral research. 
21 ASDMA. (2012). Assam state disaster report - 10 August 2012, 3. 
22 World Bank. (2013). INDIA Cyclone Phailin in Odisha; October 2013 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment Report. 
Bhubaneshwar. 
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Response Facility (RRF) for responding to immediate humanitarian needs. Another grant 
of €2 m was provided for humanitarian and early recovery projects from the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO).23  
 
3. Method 
This paper draws on qualitative data to describe three cases where humanitarian 
agencies formed consortia for post-disaster operations funded by international donor 
agencies. Fourteen in-depth interviews were conducted with staff and consultants 
working with the consortia member agencies and their partner NGOs in Assam and 
Odisha. The open ended interviews were based on a standard set of questions on 
agencies’ activities, relationships with other consortium members, politics and internal 
functioning, and the experience of working with the donors, government bodies and 
local partner NGOs. This information was triangulated with documents, consortia 
meetings minutes and agency reports.  
The research also benefits from extensive field data from areas where Oxfam India 
implemented its programme in Assam and Odisha. The study relied on  household 
interviews, participatory learning and action tools such as transect walks, focus group 
discussions and participatory mapping and change analyses. The author’s work with 
Oxfam India in Odisha allows also for reflections and observations on working in a 
consortium. The findings and analyses presented here are author’s own and are not 
endorsed by any of these agencies. The aim of the case studies is not to compare the 
performance of agency members, or to draw comparisons across the cases, but rather 
to consider consortium approaches in post-disaster response and recovery operations. 
 
4. Case studies  
Case study 1: Consortia funded by ECHO for early recovery in Assam floods 
In July 2012, following the Assam floods, ECHO provided support to eight agencies and 
INGOs for relief and recovery works in the flood affected districts in Assam.24 Three of 
these organisations, Action Aid, Christian Aid and Oxfam India, decided to form a 
                                                      
23 Krishnan, S., Purwar, D., & Borah, B. (2015). Sanitation and disasters: A case study of community and institutional 
response to Cyclone Phailin, Odisha 2013. Waterlines, 34(4), 412–423. https://doi.org/10.3362/1756-3488.2015.034 
24 Document: Assam Floods Analysis Last accessed on 1 June 2017 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Analysis%20Assam%20floods%20%2821.08.2012%29.pdf 
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consortium to ensure a more extensive response through effective collaboration, 
coordination and mutual support in six of the worst affected districts.25  The funding 
awarded to this consortium was € 900,000 for 6 months, further divided among the 
members according to their individual programme budget. Action Aid was the lead 
agency in finalising and submitting the bid to ECHO with central management from their 
headquarters (Action Aid UK), the grantholder agency. The agencies worked through  
local implementing partners in several districs, as specified below. 
This grant was for undertaking water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), emergency food 
security and livelihoods (EFSL) and shelter projects. WASH interventions included 
installation of hand pumps; construction of flush latrines and bathing cubicles; 
distribution of chlorine tablets for water purification; provision of hygiene and women's 
sanitary kits; waste management via cleaning of drainage systems and health education 
sessions. EFSL consisted primarily of two types of cash transfers: cash for work projects 
and unconditional transfers to the most vulnerable populations.  
Each agency had different sectoral expertise and developed guidelines, training and 
workshops within respective sectors: Oxfam had strong background in WASH and 
gender mainstreaming, Christian Aid took the lead on shelter, inclusion and advocacy 
issues and Action Aid had expertise in livelihoods, nutrition and mainstreaming disaster 
risk reduction (DRR).26 Oxfam acted as WASH coordinator,  developing a common WASH 
strategy, and teams were deployed in the field to establish strong coordination between 
these organizational activities. 27  The member agencies held regular coordination 
meetings and workshops to share technical support, advice and share lessons learnt. A 
Consortium Manager, appointed to coordinate with the members, undertook field visits 
to project areas, participated in evaluations and donor visits, facilitated regular  
reporting by the member agencies to the lead and donor agencies. 
The partnerships depended upon the local NGO’s interests and capacities, as well as its 
familiarity with the context and prior experience of working after disasters.28  
• Action Aid worked with Peoples Action for Development (PAD) in Sonitpur, 
Northeast Affected Areas Development Society (NEADS) Gramya Vikash Mancha 
(GVM) in Sivsagar and Kamrup districts.  
• Christian Aid partnered with Rural Volunteers Centre (RVC), an Assamese NGO 
based in Dhemaji district and Sustainable Environment and Ecological 
                                                      
25 Document: Oxfam Assam flood response 2012-13 report, 01-03-13 
26 Document: Final Consolidated Consortium progress report consortium 31Dec2013 
27 Document: Oxfam Situation Report Number: 15, December 26, 2012, Prepared by: India Humanitarian Hub, Oxfam  
28 Interview, Agency staff Oxfam 2013 
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Development Society (SEEDS) based in New Delhi in Dhemaji and Lakhimpur. 
SEEDS provided support in shelter implementation.  
• Oxfam worked with Promotion and Advancement of Justice Harmony and Rights 
of Adivasis (PAJHRA) in Sonitpur and Morigaon Mahila Mehfil (MMM) in 
Morigaon.  
PAJHRA, a rights-based organization, primarily worked with Adivasis of Assam and rights 
for the Scheduled Tribes. Disaster response and recovery did not fall under its 
organisational mandate; yet they partnered with Oxfam in the response programme in 
Sonitpur on humanitarian grounds.29 MMM, on the other hand,  was a traditional 
partner of Oxfam, having worked in DRR programmes in 2006-2007. MMM had a long-
standing presence in Morigaon, influencing government policies and participating in 
district coordination meetings. They advocate on issues of erosion and impacts on lives 
and livelihoods of people displaced in Morigaon over the years. Once the ECHO funded 
programme ended in May 2013, Oxfam’s programme operations in Sonitpur ceased and 
the partnership with PAJHRA ended. When floods and erosion recurred in Sonitpur and 
Morigaon in 2013 displacing the same households, the consortium agencies, including 
Oxfam adopted a non-interventionist approach. MMM provided relief to displaced 
families in Morigaon and undertook needs assessment but could not extend continuous 
support due to lack of external funding support.  
The nature of floods and impact of the 2012 floods varied across these districts in 
Assam. The agencies took different approaches to sector-specific interventions in 
response to the needs of the local communities. In upper reaches of Brahmaputra, flash 
floods were common. Traditionally, Mishing communities in this region lived in chang 
ghars i.e. houses built on stilts to cope with inundation caused by flash floods. Christian 
Aid and and partners in Dhemaji and Lakhimpur constructed chang ghars to suit local 
practices. In lower reaches of Brahmaputra, when floods occurred, houses remained 
submerged for days at a time. The riverbank also suffered from regular erosion, causing 
large tracts of land to be engulfed by the river along with houses and other facilities. In 
Morigaon, Oxfam consulted with MMM and local communities, finding that households 
were displaced overnight by floods.30 Communities were provided with mobile housing 
units that could be easily dismantled during floods and erosion.  
The consortium members collaborated in developing common guidelines on programme 
design and interventions; they agreed on providing context-specific facilities according 
to need. Both Action Aid and Oxfam were working in Sonitpur; they shared information 
                                                      
29 Interview, Agency staff PAJHRA 2013  
30 Document: Oxfam Assam flood response 2012-13 report, 01-03-13 
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with each other and government bodies to avoid duplication and competition, ensuring 
that activities were undertaken in separate blocks and village councils. They reported to 
the local authorities in a coordinated manner wherever possible and disseminated 
similar messages to the community members. Despite these precautions, two 
neighbouring villages in one block were provided with different facilities. One village 
received a lower quality of material assistance than the other.31 The shelter materials, 
quality and house design were different, as was the structure and design of water 
facilities. Action Aid ensured continuous access to safe water during floods and installed 
handpumps on raised concrete platforms, which could be accessed during floods by 
boats (Figure 1). Oxfam decided against raised platform handpumps since they added to 
costs for poor households, and were in any case at risk of being washed away by erosion 
(Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Raised concrete platform with steps for water source by Action Aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
31 FGD, Solmari village August 2013 
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Figure 2: Concrete platforms for handpumps provided by Oxfam  
Although the attention to an efficient process was much needed, it was time consuming 
and the participating agencies were too focussed on streamlining activities to achieve 
their committed sectoral objectives. They had different interpretations of concepts like 
resilience, risk reduction and what was achievable through advocacy and longer-term 
involvement with local government bodies. 
 An agency official commented: 
“We learn from each other; each organisation has their own expertise, mandate, 
objective. The way agencies do things are also different. In principle it 
contributes, but when it comes to policy-level work, it is still not coming together, 
for issues of dam, land, which are larger issues. In addressing humanitarian 
crises, we are fine, but (addressing)  root causes we have not developed in 
consortia yet.”32 
Such issues were taken up at a smaller scale by other actors in Assam outside of the 
humanitarian partnerships and consortia. There were other NGOs who worked in 
development programmes and in conflict response programmes in Assam during 2012-
2014. There were civil society organisations advocating against dam construction, 
displacement of communities and for the civil rights of tribal populations. Other 
coordination mechanisms existed in the state such as Inter Agency Groups (IAGs), and 
state-level and district management committees activated during the monsoons, but  
                                                      
32 Interview Oxfam India staff 2014 
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not engaged in longer-term recovery. Staff from International NGOs (INGOs), including 
those from outside of the consortia, attended InterAgency Coordination Meetings after 
the floods to coordinate and agree upon district allocations at these meetings, thereby 
substantially reducing the risk of overlapping interventions. These meetings occurred in 
the immediate aftermath and did not continue for recovery operations. There was little 
evidence of how the consortia members interacted with existing mechanisms for 
exchanging knowledge among this wider group of actors. 
 
Case study 2: Consortia supported by UK AID for humanitarian response in Odisha 
Cyclone Phailin and floods 
Following the success of the consortium approach in Assam, and after the cyclone, UK 
AID and ECHO each supported two consortia in Odisha, with 5  INGOs in each 
consortium. Following flooding in Uttarakhand in July 2013 in India, UK AID funded three 
NGOs to respond (ActionAid, Christian Aid, Care) and both outputs and outcomes met 
the donor expectations. Their successful work together on this response was clear 
evidence that they could function successfully as a consortium. 33 After Cyclone Phailin 
and floods, UK AID staff visited the worst-hit village in Puri to assess the damage of 
cyclone on 20th October. The Rapid Response Facility (RRF) call for proposals opened on 
26th October 2013 and interested agencies had 36 hours to submit a unified proposal to 
bid for the funding. Senior management staff from the interested agencies rushed to 
submit a joint proposal that broadly addressed the immediate and future recovery 
needs of the communities. Some agencies were yet to complete their comprehensive 
needs assessments in the affected areas.  
UK AID decided to grant £2m through its Rapid Response Facility (RRF) for responding to 
the immediate humanitarian needs from 1st November 2013 for 12 weeks. While 
assessing the ability of the participating members, financial risk and fraud, UK AID 
noted, 
“All partners are members of UK AID’s Rapid Response Facility (RRF), a mechanism 
that allows funding to be disbursed to pre-qualified partners following a 
humanitarian emergency within 72 hours of activation. Membership of the RRF is 
only granted following a thorough assessment of the capabilities and capacities of 
applications from organisations by a panel of humanitarian advisers, and successful 
applicants went through a detailed due diligence process. UK AID works with all of 
the partners being funded on a regular basis across the world, they are well 
                                                      
33 UK AID. (2013). Humanitarian Response to Cyclone Phailin in India: Business Case and Intervention Summary. UK Department for International Development. 
 12 
established and trusted humanitarian partners; most recently it funded several of 
them in India in response to the flooding in Uttarakhand in July 2013.”  34  
 
 Two consortia received this funding, led by Christian Aid and Save the Children 
respectively. €1.14 m was provided to the Christian Aid –led consortium, consisting also 
of Action Aid, Oxfam, Care, and Plan; €1.11m was awarded to the Save the Children–led 
consortium, with Handicap, HelpAge and World Vision as members, and €28674 went to 
MapAction. Initially it was expected that a total of 30,977 vulnerable households 
(approximately 154,855 people) would be provided with basic humanitarian assistance 
including shelter, clean drinking water, and cooking utensils. UK AID made the case for 
the arrangement: 
“It is expected that funding NGOs to work in consortia should significantly drive 
value for money, reducing cost by procuring in bulk, driving down prices, and 
being able to share warehousing, transport and other facilities. It should drive up 
quality in terms of co-ordination, common needs assessments, avoiding 
duplication, and driving up quality of goods by ensuring the best and most 
appropriate supplier choices are available. Although agreeing common minimum 
specifications and division of work may cause some delays in terms of speed in 
forming consortia, it is expected that this will be made up due to the other gains, 
and that overall forming consortia should not affected speed of the intervention.” 
35 
This case study focuses on the operations undertaken by Oxfam with its local partners 
as part of the Christian Aid-led consortium.  Christian Aid ensured adherence to 
timelines, programme quality, and reporting. Oxfam was the logistics lead, responsible 
for purchasing kit items, maintaining warehouse, transportation and delivery for the five 
consortium members. Initially the funding was for 14100 households, but with exchange 
gains, and savings on bulk purchases the target was increased to 21672 affected 
households. 36 The organisational strength and ability was evident in the consortium’s 
efficient mechanisms for procurement, management and bulk deliveries by vendors.37 
Three warehouses were leased for 4 months in Bhubhaneshwar, and a Logistics 
Manager was hired to oversee the entire process of procurement, transport and 
distribution for all members. Household relief kit items and communication materials 
were standardized, with common Information Education and Communication (IEC) 
materials in local languages using pictorial representation and common beneficiary 
                                                      
34 UK AID. (2013). Humanitarian Response to Cyclone Phailin in India: Business Case and Intervention Summary. UK Department for International Development. 
35 UK AID. (2013). Humanitarian Response to Cyclone Phailin in India: Business Case and Intervention Summary. UK Department for International Development. 
36 Meeting notes: December 2013, Oxfam India 
37 Meeting notes: December 2013, Oxfam India 
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cards. Member agencies also agreed on common guidelines for targeting households 
with inclusion criteria and community participation processes to be followed for 
household selection.  
The local NGOs in Odisha successfully led early evacuation, efficient warehouse 
management and logistics for immediate relief distribution and community 
mobilisation. Oxfam partnered with the Society for Leprosy Amelioration & 
Rehabilitation (SOLAR) in Puri, United Artists’ Association in Ganjam and UNNAYAN in 
Balasore. In the past these organisations partnered during disaster risk reduction 
programmes. When cyclone warnings were received, their staff undertook immediate 
measures to evacuate families along the coastline and to provide food rations and 
drinking water to the families taking refuge in the cyclone and multipurpose shelters. 
The staff  relied on the networks and partnerships developed since 1999 Super Cyclone. 
This enabled the NGOs to undertake immediate relief distribution in all three districts 
with emergency funding support from Oxfam.   
In Puri, SOLAR worked with a local youth group called Gopinath Juvak Sangh which 
provided information, disseminated warnings to remotest coastal communities and 
coordinated evacuation efforts. These networks were crucial for spreading the warning 
messages through mobile phones, loudspeakers and local community networks. UAA 
and UNNAYAN had stockpiles of hygiene and shelter kit items maintained through their 
DRR programme with Oxfam. These materials were mobilised and distributed 
immediately along with rescue operations. UNNAYAN deployed its community boats to 
rescue local people during the floods in Balasore. It also supported community kitchens 
run by members of women’s self-help groups (SHGs) that distributed cooked food to 
more than 12,000 people in Balasore. The local agencies and network groups relied on 
each other for information and to mobilize resources for the affected families. UAA 
loaned their prepositioned stockpiles of food and tarpaulins to SOLAR for immediate 
distribution to worst-affected villages in Puri. UAA distributed food packets in Ganjam 
on 19th October. These partnerships demonstrated that local NGOs are quick to respond 
if financial systems with the INGOs are in place. 
Under the UK AID funding, there were delays in distribution of relief kits across both 
consortia. The first UK AID distribution was initiated by Oxfam in Puri only on 8th 
December 2013. The items included in household kits included water filters, buckets, 
temporary shelter materials, soap, sanitary cloth materials, utensil kits and solar 
lanterns. Household water filters and kitchen sets (i.e. utensils) were targeted at 
women-headed households affected during the cyclone. The  UK AID programme 
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reached a total of  23,670 people through consortium efforts although the aid was not 
quick and timely.  
Oxfam carried out a post-distribution monitoring survey in Balasore, Ganjam and Puri 
district with 357 selected households from 38 project villages.38 Some of the survey 
feedback referred to quality of the materials and the appropriateness of the items. 
There were few complaints about the quality of solar lamps, plastic mugs, tarpaulin 
sheets, sanitary napkins or quality of fleece blankets; but 57% of the respondents 
wanted mosquito nets to be the part of the relief kit. Some project staff felt that 
standardisation of relief kit items resulted in inappropriate materials being included. 
Weather varied across the three districts and some needed fleece blankets more than 
others. Focus group discussions in Puri and Balasore stressed the need for nailcutters 
and mosquito nets.  
 
Numerous logistical challenges resulted from catering to each agency’s ways of working 
and response practices. Procurement was delayed for instance in finalising the kit items. 
Because agencies had agreed to start distribution in the villages only when all kit items 
arrived for all the members, there were further delays, as vendors found it difficult to 
meet the agreed delivery schedules for bulk items. 39 The delays in procurement of the 
kit items caused delays in response times, unfortunate given the critical need of the 
affected communities.  
Reflecting on these delays, an official remarked on the disadvantages of the consortium 
approach: 
“The complications of working in a consortium are that it is process heavy; 
transaction costs are high; decision making in a consortia also takes time. It leads 
to clashes of ideas, although initially agencies come together, the ways of 
working of each organisation is different. [..] The fastest consortium member’s 
efforts get dragged down by the slowest member agency in terms of delivery”40  
Streamlining the procurement of relief kit materials meant some financial gains. Savings 
from cost negotiations with vendors and exchange gains helped the consortium to 
increase the number of households reached out. But the process was seriously delayed 
due to bottlenecks of operating in a large consortium. Agencies were encouraged to 
include sanitary cloths and napkins, solar lamps, cooking sets and water filters, which 
they would not have included in their relief kits otherwise.  
                                                      
38 Post Distribution Monitoring Report (v2) Emergency Non-Food Assistance to Cyclone Phailin and Flood Affected Communities in Odisha. 2013 - 2014  
39 Meeting notes: December 2013, Oxfam India 
40 Interview, Action Aid staff, 2014) 
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Consortium members also came together for advocacy through regular joint reporting 
of achievements and programme outputs, using social networking sites and blogposts to 
document and share initiatives.41 These initiatives were limited to the programme 
duration, as the collaboration was donor-specific. However, the experience was 
instrumental in facilitating easier coordination when Cyclone Hudhud affected Odisha in 
2014. 42  
Case study 3: Consortia funded by ECHO for early recovery in Odisha  
After Cyclone Phailin, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department (ECHO) financed €3 million for assistance to cyclone-affected populations 
during early recovery. Action Aid and Save the Children led two consortia to implement 
the recovery programme. This case study details the consortium led by Action Aid and 
operations undertaken by Oxfam with its local partners. The early recovery programme 
included shelter, WASH and EFSL components. The Action Aid -led consortium included 
Christian Aid, Oxfam, Plan and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), 
working  in Ganjam, Puri, Balasore and Mayurbhanj districts, with the objective of  
providing 10 months of support to over 180,000 people from the worst affected and 
most socially disadvantaged communities. The expected results were:  
• improved access to food and income-generating opportunities through cash 
transfers, restoration of livelihood and increased access to government 
entitlements.  
• shelters rebuilt and restored for the most vulnerable households in the target 
communities, through material and knowledge support, incorporating DRR 
techniques to reduce the future vulnerability. 
•  increased access to safe drinking water and increased awareness on positive 
hygiene practices.  
The consortium members held an inception workshop in December 2013 to plan and 
standardise their activities. There were cross-learning visits, learning and evaluation 
workshops, and joint capacity building exercises on gender, shelter and WASH. Sphere 
India and Inter-Agency Group (IAG)-Odisha were involved in coordination between the 
two consortia for regular updates and joint initiatives and advocacy efforts.  
                                                      
41 https://phailincycloneresponse.wordpress.com/ 
42 Document: Sphere India report, last accessed on 1st June 2017 https://sphereindiablog.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/situation-
report-1-flood-and-heavy-rainfall-in-odisha-05th-august2014/ 
 
 16 
There were many motivations for agencies to participate in the consortia. The funding 
share and budget was divided amongst the five participating member agencies in each 
consortium according to their proposed budget and activities. An official commented: 
“There is lot of value of working in consortia, I would rate it on a positive side. 
Obviously there are flip sides. Not each member may have the same enthusiasm 
and same spirit while working together. In Assam there were three members, 
now there are five, the speed and interest varies. [..] This needs to be further 
strengthened as a consortia. [..] The problem is always speed vs. accuracy, and 
consensus vs the USP of each organisation.” 43 
Consortia offered a space for learning and exchange of ideas. An official from the 
member agency said: 
“There are pros and cons of working in [a] consortia: It gives you an advantage of 
bringing up a programme at a large scale, 2-3 big organisations come together 
to address needs and cover a large area; sharing of skills, competencies [..] and 
leads to cross-fertilization of skills and ideas; attracting donors to work in 
consortia – in terms of outreach and enhanced coverage and visibility.”44 
Different member agencies took the lead in staff training and capacity building  in 
different sectors and aspects of programming. Oxfam facilitated training in WASH, 
Gender mainstreaming and EFSL. A joint workshop on “Rapid Assessment of Emergency 
Food Security and Livelihood by Using 48 Hour Assessment Tool” was held, where all the 
member agencies participated and undertook assessments led by ECHO. Christian Aid 
facilitated Shelter ‘Training of Trainers’ (TOT) for the participating agencies in Ganjam.  
An official commented: 
“All agencies did not have similar capacities. Some are experts and have strong 
core humanitarian principles [..], while others are rights-based, and some others 
are child-centric. Therefore at times when there were delays [..] by participating 
agency, others chipped in and helped them out.”45 
There were some issues related to interventions in each sector, across different 
member agencies. Despite the pressing need for shelter in the recovery phase, Oxfam 
proposed only 25 shelters due to limited funding. Since government was providing 
                                                      
43 Interview, Christian Aid staff, 2014 
44 Interview, Action Aid staff, 2013 
45 Interview, Christian Aid staff, 2014 
 17 
permanent housing, Oxfam reasoned that transitional houses were redundant  and 
would delay reconstruction. Under ECHO guidelines, cash disbursements had to be 
delivered to households within 90 days of the programme’s commencement. This put 
enormous pressure in rapid identification, verification and disbursement of cash for 
unconditional grants, and for cash for work projects to plan, design, approve and 
implement community projects. 46 
Decision-making in consortia was a time-consuming process: during workshops, 
meetings and joint training events, time was spent on streamlining and initiating new 
processes and formats, instead of gathering evidence and catering to longer-term 
community needs. Within the consortium, financial compliance and reporting were 
complicated, time consuming and repetitive at times. Donor regulations and mandatory 
conditions were to be fulfilled with due diligence; any change in project outputs, budget 
and activities were to be reported, and approved by the donor. Donors asked for precise 
documentation for money spent at community level: financial audits by donors required 
papers and signatures for goods received by recipients and community participants even 
for biscuits purchased during community meetings and training events. Donors laid huge 
emphasis on visibility and transparency; agencies complied by installing visibility boards 
and banners displaying donor logos in the villages. This did not directly contribute to 
programme sustainability or effectiveness. The emphasis on outcomes, gathering 
gender disaggregated data for weekly/monthly/quarterly reporting for targeted and 
reached beneficiaries – was time-consuming. The monitoring teams did not adequately 
assess the implications of quick decisions on targeting in shorter time-periods. For 
instance, when few women-headed households in a village received kitchen sets there 
were protests from other community members, which could have been resolved with 
community discussions and resolutions.  
There was no systematic approach for evaluating the impact of consortium programme. 
Individual agencies undertook various kinds of in-house evaluations, sometimes using 
third parties. As consortium members, they collected quantitative sex-disaggregated 
data on beneficiaries and outreach to indicate targets were being met. Oxfam 
undertook real-time evaluations to analyse their own programmes and performance, 
and the challenges and experiences of working in the consortium. In addition there 
were  end-of-project evaluations undertaken by visiting donors  to validate the success 
and effectiveness of their programmes. More systematic and streamlined evaluation 
approaches would contribute to high quality programming, and strengthen technical 
                                                      
46 Interview, Christian Aid staff, 2014 
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capability, accountability, organisational capacity, and human resource management to 
improve consortia approaches in the future.  
Six months after the cyclone, reports indicated that there were affected areas in the 
state not covered by agencies from either consortium. ECHO froze the livelihood 
budget-line until consortia members could offer an explanation. This forced the member 
agencies to undertake a joint assessment in February 2014 to reassess the needs of non-
priority villages, earlier ignored. Based on the assessment visits, consortia members 
propsed strategies for meeting the unmet needs of the ignored areas,  later supported 
through Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds. The agencies reported 
to ECHO that they had limited and time-bound resources within the ECHO programme 
to meet recovery needs in the operational villages, so to expand to newer areas 6 
months after the disasters was a huge challenge. Some of them, particularly Oxfam, had 
already undertaken distribution of seeds to farmers under the livelihood component 
and would have to bear huge financial losses if ECHO did not release the livelihood 
funds. 
Odisha provided a good example of other coordination mechanisms that kicked in as 
soon as cyclone warnings were put up. As soon as local agencies received warning and 
information, they coordinated with district administration. Coordination meetings were 
held at the district level, state level and with block-level government agencies and NGOs 
on 9th October 2013. National agencies participated in the state-level meetings,  
activated their partner networks and mobilized community groups for immediate 
evacuation, exchange of information and pre-positioning food stocks, boats and hygiene 
kits.  
There were also successful instances of government-non-government coordination in 
Puri and Ganjam to facilitate relief distribution, allotment of villages across responding 
agencies and information sharing with the district administration and humanitarian 
agencies. In Puri, SOLAR was the focal point at the district level for government-NGO 
coordination. They actively engaged in coordinating with the district authorities and 
other responding groups – such as youth groups, Red Cross etc. Within weeks of the 
cyclone, in Ganjam, local responding NGOs set up the Ganjam Disaster Response Forum 
to respond to issues after the cyclone and flood, and work efficiently on relief and 
restoration. This informal forum was formed to coordinate relief and restoration work 
with the government, INGOs, local NGOs and other stakeholders. This was helpful to 
avoid duplication and utilization of available resources to reach the most affected 
people. The forum met with the District Collector Ganjam and project directors of 
government line departments frequently to strengthen government organisation-non-
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government organisation coordination. The forum set up a profile of Ganjam NGOs and 
CBOs and mobilized volunteers for the district pool and local level interventions. This 
information on local NGOs activities on post disaster intervention was relayed to the 
government, donors and different stakeholders through emails and meeting minutes. 
However these mechanisms were functional only for a few weeks following the cyclone. 
Moreover, these multiple coordination mechanisms were confusing and did not serve 
the purpose of reducing duplications; it took time to decide on who would work 
where.47 As a learning exercise, the participating members in the Action Aid consortium 
debated working towards an agreement between like-minded agencies and the 
development of a “Consortium Kit” that would include baseline-endline formats, needs 
assessment formats and processes, IEC materials, pre-agreed standard hygiene kit and a 
compiled vendor list. It was also suggested that agencies should pre-position life saving 
materials in disaster-prone areas for faster relief distribution. The following 
observations were made during the exercise: 48 
- Donor level coordination was effective and helped ensure that agencies cross-
verified the targeting/geography 
- The consortium was instrumental in undertaking joint training and capacity 
building in WASH and Shelter and included disability as a criterion across the 
consortium as a common approach towards targeting.  
- There was good coordination within the consortium and to some extent 
between consortia (especially for geographical targeting) 
- Having several parallel coordination mechanisms – IAG (existing), Cyclone Phailin 
Response Forum, and Sphere India – was challenging. Sphere, for instance, 
created confusion with an additional mechanism and a lack of ‘buy in’ from 
existing coordination mechanism at state and district level. Their roles need to 
be questioned during a crisis situation.  
 
5. Analysis 
 
Between  2012-2013 in Assam and in Odisha, the number of players increased in each 
consortium, as did the number of international donors willing to invest in humanitarian 
action through consortia. In all three cases, three or more agencies banded together on 
joint post-disaster needs assessment, common proposals to donors and implementation 
of programmes within agency-specified geographical areas. In Odisha, multiple donors 
                                                      
47 Document: Framework for Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons learnt exercise Note 
48 Document: Framework for Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons learnt exercise Note 
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funded multiple consortia with different agencies collaborating. There were clear 
financial advantages to working in a consortium, which attracted more participants in 
Odisha. With assured funding support, agencies were able to plan, design and 
implement early recovery programmes and meet their humanitarian objectives. 
Working in a consortium reduced duplication, given the unified proposal for sector-
specific interventions within agency-specific locations. Regular meetings allowed 
agencies to develop formats and procedures for joint reporting, needs assessment, data 
collection, intervention and financial mechanisms and to provide technical support to 
each other and share lessons with the other members. This enhanced organisational 
capacities and expertise, and expanded outreach, increasing scale and financial gains. 
The Emergency Capacity Building report on consortium-building lauds the strength in 
numbers, with participating agencies developing joint advocacy strategy to influence 
government actions.49  
 
Yet, as the number of actors involved in the consortia increased, there was more 
confusion, delay and dissatisfaction at community level. In Assam, there was the 
instance where neighbouring communites received different forms of material support. 
With increasing numbers of actors using this approach, stronger evidence is required on 
how relationships between the participating agencies are formed, developed and 
nurtured to make the consortium effective. Although it was beyond the scope of the 
study to investigate the motivations of the agencies, it has been argued elsewhere that 
coordination is a voluntary process, offering the potential of strength through consensus 
while maintaining the autonomy of individual organisations. 50  However, as noted 
elsewhere in literature, “poor performance of just one agency can compromise the 
effectiveness of all others.” 51 This points to the need to strengthen the abilities of 
individual organisations before they participate  in a consortium, in order to enhance 
the collective effectiveness. 
 
Consortia are clearly a donor-driven phenomenon. Consortium formation, pushed by 
international donors, reflects the introduction of results-based management, compelling 
NGO staff to demonstrate that their activities would ‘add value’,  52 an orientation that 
sometimes encumbered just and context-appropriate interventions. This was evident in 
                                                      
49 ECB (2012), What We Know About Collaboration: the ECB Country Consortium Experience Emergency Capacity Building: The 10. Key Factors for Success 
www.ecbproject.org/consortium/learning 
50 Raju, E., & Becker, P. (2013). Multi-organisational coordination for disaster recovery: The story of post-tsunami Tamil Nadu, India. International Journal of 
Disaster Risk Reduction, 4, 82–91. doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.02.004 
51 Bennett J, Bertrand W, Harkin C, Samarasinghe S, Wickramatillake H. Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries. 
London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition; 2006. 
52 Fiori, Juliano, Fernando Espada, Jessica Field, and Sophie Dicker. The Echo Chamber: Results, Management, and the Humanitarian Effectiveness Agenda. 
London: Humanitarian Affairs Team & Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, 2016. 
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the ECHO funded programme in Odisha, where ECHO froze the budget-line for 
livelihood interventions following confusion on populations ignored by the consortia 
members,  the result of communication gaps, and decisions made in haste in the rush to 
submit donor proposals.  
 
Another area for refinement is the evaluation methods that connect the dots between 
the member agencies’ efforts, donor requirements and the aspirations of beneficiaries. 
Agencies work to capture community needs during joint needs assessment; they also 
monitor progress with the help of common formats for process monitoring surveys, 
post-distribution surveys, baseline and endline surveys. A mid-line report and end of 
programme report is submitted by the lead agency. Meanwhile, consortium members 
hold inception workshops, regular monthly meetings and lessons learnt or reflections 
workshops to develop a unified system to intervene as a consortium.  The evidence 
suggests that agencies can be overburdened and that more streamlined approaches to 
evaluation could strengthen its value as well as reducing the burden.  
 
The continuity and sustainability of the model remains a challenge for longer-term 
recovery. In Assam, once the consortium programme ended, local NGOs lacked access 
to funding for another response programme in 2013 for recurring flooding, or for 
longer-term development issues. Their limited logistical, financial and human resources 
were huge limitations in ensuring their active partnerships in the consortium model. 
Although this is not a consortium-specific challenge, the approach could well 
incorporate longer-term objectives and roles for local NGOs with appropriate support 
for accessing funding.  
Defining the role of local NGOs to better reflect local aspirations and governance 
mechanisms is another area where the consortium-approach could be strengthened. 
Although INGOs are the signatories to the donor funds, they  could not implement 
programmes without the help of local NGOs. Yet local NGOs are rarely able to influence 
programme initiatives. Research has shown they also face a disproportionate financial 
burden and the bureaucratic hassles of partnering with INGOs and international donors; 
these local NGOs struggle to access donor funding because they are expected to adopt 
new bureaucratic measures as a condition for funding. 53 
The role of affected populations also calls for consideration. If this model continues to 
be deployed in emergencies without further research, there is the danger that it will 
replicate social power imbalances through organisational hierarchies. A more coherent 
                                                      
53 Fiori, Juliano, Fernando Espada, Jessica Field, and Sophie Dicker. The Echo Chamber: Results, Management, and the Humanitarian 
Effectiveness Agenda. London: Humanitarian Affairs Team & Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, 2016. 
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strategy to encourage participation of affected populations and reflect their aspirations 
for disaster recovery is critical. These populations can rarely voice concerns on issues 
that matter to them, or shape strategies within consortia and thereby donor attitudes. 
The consortium approach should, as noted, include creative ways to evaluate 
effectiveness  and how best they can meet the aspirations and needs of the affected 
populations.  
In the cases described here, the consortium approach, like other approaches – cluster 
approach, GO-NGO coordination mechanisms – focused on project-specific outputs 
rather than the longer-term outcomes that reflect community needs and aspirations. It 
is an improvement on other approaches, however, as discussed in section 2, as it is 
tailored to the context and has access to better funding and resources. To ensure a shift 
in focus from outputs to outcomes within the consortium approach requires the 
alignment and commitment of various actors to going beyond limited project objectives. 
Related to this is the question of whether programmes implemented by consortia are 
flexible enough to accommodate the dynamic changes in the field during recovery. The 
answer was a resounding no in the case of Assam, where ECHO was not forthcoming 
with support to the affected and displaced communities when flooding recurred.  
There is an interesting overarching question to reflect upon: What purpose does the 
consortium-model serve? From these case studies it emerges that consortia for now 
seem to be  donor-driven, valued as a way to use limited resources more efficiently. 
However, if saving money takes precedence over other outcomes, it becomes a 
debatable virtue. If funds are efficiently used, but fail to meet the dynamic and longer-
term needs of the affected communities, or if there are delays in providing life-saving 
relief materials, then the formation of consortia seems both unnecessary and 
misguided. 
 INGOs are attracted to the consortium-model as it provides access to funding and 
opportunities to collaboratively implement programmes and maximise coverage. But 
this can be a superficial logic and agencies have to give more thought to their objectives 
and make conscious choices to form and work in consortia. To help agencies make this 
decision, further research and evidence is required.  Meanwhile agencies can at least 
aim  to be fully aware of both the benefits and the trade offs of any coordination in 
responding  to humanitarian emergencies.  
6. Conclusions 
Consortia operate as a coordination mechanism and provide space for joint learning and 
exchange of ideas, common standards,  programming approaches and advocacy efforts. 
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The cases described here show that the consortium-model can contribute positively in 
humanitarian response in developing countries. The model is gaining traction in India, 
where such efforts have been able to supplement government programmes in crisis 
times for short periods. There are clear advantages in terms of financial savings and 
increased geographical coverage. However, collaboration needs to be strengthened.  
There is scope for improving this model and increasing its value. Interested agencies,  
through advance preparations, could nurture relationships and put plans in  place  to 
operate as consortia during future emergencies, so that community needs can be 
satisfied effectively and quickly. 54 Concerted efforts could be made to better reflect 
community aspirations by capturing their inputs throughout the programme cycle. 
Agencies should define roles and responsibilities and offer stronger partnerships with 
local collaborating NGOs. If these areas are addressed, consortia could provide an equal 
and just space for organisations to benefit from each other, serve the communities 
affected by disasters, and  support and build local institutions as a longer-term strategy 
for disaster resilience. Fiori et al (2016) state that: 
“International humanitarian NGOs have been stymied by their dysfunctional 
relationships with host governments in South Asia. But in their own focus on 
technical concerns, and faced with diminishing emergency response capacity, 
they have continually resorted to the implementation of standardised shortterm 
projects. The effect of this has been to legitimise the very bureaucratic and self-
serving structures that have stymied them. They have then sought to address 
challenges that fundamentally relate to power and the exercise of authority 
through coordination.” 55 
The value of working in consortia will only be strengthened if members aim to address 
these kinds of structural issues and to overcome organisational barriers that hinder their 
effective and smooth functioning as consortium members. 
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